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INTRODUCTION

One of the most contentious issues in contemporary debates over
environmental policy is whether regulators should use cost-benefit analysis
in evaluating their decisions. Cost-benefit analysis requires that the costs
and benefits of a proposed course of action (including benefits such as
saving human lives and protecting human health) be quantified and then
translated into dollar ter:ns. Cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations
is said to be necessary in order to avoid adopting inefficient rules that
would impose ruinous economic costs. 1 Such analysis is also said, in
theory, to be a neutral, objective method of evaluating policies and offering
transparent judgments on the merits of a proposal. 2

* Frank Ackennan is an environmental economist and research director of the Global
Development and Environment Institute (GDAE) at Tufts University. Lisa Heinzerling is a
Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. Rachel Massey is a Research
Associate at GDAE. The authors are grateful to Thomas Henry, Gabrielle Hennan, Jennifer
Lappin, Trevor Wiessmann, and Danielle Woods for research assistance.
1. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 59 (The New Press 2004).
2. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1489,
1504-05 (2002).
155
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Fans of cost-benefit analysis who argue that this technique is a neutral
tool for evaluating public policies must be able to show that the analysis is
not simply a one-way street to deregulation. Thus, in evaluating their
arguments, it is instructive to ask a simple question: If this analytical device
had been applied in the 1970s and earlier, would it have endorsed the early
successes of health and environmental regulation? Or would it have
resulted in negative judgments wherever and whenever it was applied? The
latter is the more accurate answer, with just a few exceptions, as we
demonstrate in this Article.
The first wave of modem environmental protection, beginning in the
1960s and 1970s, cleaned up the air and water, protected fragile
ecosystems, and achieved great gains in public healtlr-without reliance on
cost-benefit analysis, and clearly without destroying the economy.3 Why
can't we continue to make environmental policy this way? Advocates of
cost-benefit analysis must believe that times have changed. Perhaps past
environmental policies have already hit the easy targets, where the need for
regulation was obvious; in the standard metaphor, all the low-hanging fruit
might already have been picked.
If this were the case, the environmental regulations of the past should
easily pass a cost-benefit test. If today's methods of cost-benefit analysis
had been applied in the past, would it have given its blessing to the early
regulations which now look so successful in retrospect? The answer is no.
This conclusion derives from three case studies: the removal of lead from
gasoline in the 1970s and 1980s, the decision not to dam the Grand Canyon
for hydroelectric power in the 1960s, and the strict regulation of workplace
exposure to vinyl chloride in 1974. The technique would have gotten the
answer wrong in all three cases. Each case study illustrates, in a different
manner, the damage that cost-benefit analysis could have done in the past,
had it played the central role that is proposed for it today. The problems
with cost-benefit analysis of regulations lie deep within the methodology;4
it would not have done any better a generation ago than it does now.
We have argued elsewhere that environmental protection does not cause
economic hann, 5 and that the widely cited "evidence" of huge regulatory
costs is erroneous on several grounds. 6 Indeed, the entire cost-benefit
3. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE
INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 17-18 (Environmental
Law Institute 2004).
4. ACKERMAN & HElNZERLlNG, supra note 1.
S. See Frank Ackerman & Rachel Massey, Prospering With Precaution, at http://
www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubJications/articlesJeportslPrecautionAHTAug02. pdf (2002) (and
sources cited therein).
6. ACKERMAN & HElNZERLlNG, supra note 1; see also Lisa Heinzerling & Frank
Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 648
(2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981
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project is problematic and incoherent. In a cost-benefit analysis, analysts
add up the costs (for example, for pollution control equipment), and
compare them to estimates of the monetary value of the resulting benefits
(for example, the dollar value of the deaths and diseases avoided by
reducing pollution). This effort routinely fails. Although the benefits of
health and environmental protection are vitally important, this effort
routinely fails because the pecuniary value of the deaths and diseases
avoided by reducing pollution cannot be meaningfully expressed in
monetary terms. In a word, the benefits are priceless. 7 The cost-benefit
calculation's attempt to assign monetary values distorts, misrepresents, and
narrows the priceless values of life, health, and nature, and belittles the
widespread concern for the well-being of future generations.
In practice, therefore, cost-benefit analysis is an opaque and technically
intricate process accessible only to experts, and one that all too frequently
recommends rejection of sensible policies, on the grounds that their costs
exceed economists' estimates of their benefits. In the hands of John
Graham, the Bush Administration's "regulatory czar" at the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), cost-benefit analysis has been
used as a powerful weapon against regulatory initiatives proposed by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other agencies. 8
In this Article, however, we do not mount a critique from outside the
technique of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, we examine an argument that
proponents of cost-benefit analysis have offered as a linchpin of the case
for cost-benefit: that this technique is neither anti- nor pro-regulatory, but
rather a neutral tool for evaluating public policy. In making this argument,
these proponents have often invoked the use of cost-benefit analysis to
support previous regulatory decisions (their favorite example involves the
phase down of lead in gasoline, which we shall shortly discuss) as a sign
that this technique can be used to support as well as to undermine
protective regulation. As we demonstrate, however, cost-benefit analysis
would have stood as an obstacle to early regulatory successes. Before
turning to the various case studies illustrating this point, we first take a
brief look at previous efforts to undertake retrospective cost-benefit
analyses of important regulatory achievements.

(1998).
7. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 1.
8. See EUen Nakashima, For Bush's Regulatory 'Czar,' The Equation is Persuasion,
WASH. POST, May 10,2002, at A35 (noting that the Office ofInformation and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) signed off on a proposed rule aUowing companies to dump waste from coalmining operations into rivers and streams).
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I. OTHER BACKWARD GLANCES

We are not the first to explore cost-benefit analyses of past regulatory
decisions. Some retrospective cost-benefit studies have supported
environmental protection, while some commentators have suggested that
such studies show that cost-benefit analysis contains no systematic bias
against environmental regulation. 9 We believe that the wrong lesson has
been drawn from these studies, exaggerating the prospects for cost-benefit
analysis to support environmental protection in the future.
One widely cited retrospective study is a multi-year, peer-reviewed study
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the first 20 years of the
Clean Air Act (1970-90), published in 1997. This study found benefits
from air pollution regulation equal to about forty times the costs. IO More
recently, annual analyses by OIRA have estimated, retrospectively, the
monetized costs and benefits of major regulations of the recent past. The
OIRA report for 2004 estimates that major EPA regulations adopted from
1993 to 2003 imposed $22-24 billion in costs, and yielded $38-132 billion
in benefits. I I OIRA cautioned against getting too excited about these
upbeat numbers:
The majority of the large estimated benefit of EPA rules is attributable to
reduction in public exposure to a single air pollutant: fine particulate
matter. Thus, the favorable benefit-cost results for EPA regulation
should not be ~eneralized to all types of EPA rules or to all types of
clean-air rules. I

In general, as OIRA suggests, cost-benefit analysis tends to endorse
efforts to reduce a handful of high-volume air pollutants. The huge
estimated benefits of these measures account for EPA's favorable analysis
of the Clean Air Act, as well as OIRA's numbers for EPA regulations as a
whole. Look beyond the criteria air pollutants, and the evidence becomes
quite sparse for cost-benefit analysis supporting environmental protection.
Furthermore, Graham's office has worked to reduce the apparent benefits
of controlling even these widespread and harmful air pollutants. 13
Moreover, the EPA's positive cost-benefit analysis would not have been
9. See Kerry Smith, Choice Cuts, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ON-LINE (2004), available
at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=7696
(last visited Oct. 31,2004).
10. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REpORT TO CONGRESS: THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1970-1990 (1997).
11. See Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2004 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal
Entities (2004), tb1.2 [hereinafter Informing Regulatory Decisions], at http:// www.whitehou
se.gov/omblinforeg/regpolreports_ congress.html.
12. Id. at 7.
13. See Neil Shah, OMB Official Highlights EPA Problems in Assessing Benefits ofAir
Rules, INSIDE EPA, June 18,2004.
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possible at the time the Clean Air Act protections were put in place. A
huge proportion of the benefits found by the EPA were due to regulating
emissions of fine particles in the air--but the full magnitude of the harm
done by such particles was not known for many years after the Act was
first implemented. I4 If a favorable cost-benefit analysis of the Clean Air
Act's regulation of fine particles had been required before adoption of the
Act, the result would have been the same as in the lead and vinyl chloride
case studies we examine in this paper: the Act's requirements would have
been rejected for lack of sufficiently definitive data.
In another frequently cited study, economist Richard Morgenstern
assembled twelve case studies of regulations where EPA's economic
analyses played an important role. IS His case studies, written by analysts
who played a major role in the regulatory process, were chosen to highlight
the positive contribution of EPA's economic analyses (through the first
term of the Clinton administration).
Morgenstern's case studies divide naturally into three groups. In four
cases, no monetization of benefits was attempted, so no formal quantitative
comparison of costs and benefits was possible.I 6 In four cases, some
benefits were monetized, but the regulatory decision was based on
technology standards or other criteria, and did not maximize net benefits. I7
In the remaining four cases, cost-benefit analysis appeared to endorse the
final decision, weakly in one case and strongly in the other three. In two
cases, however, the cost~benefit analysis was not completed until after a
decision had been made on other grounds, so it was not a factor in the
regulatory process. 18 The two cases where cost-benefit analysis was a
crucial input into decisionmaking both involved lead poIIution. I9 The
(

14. See Environmental Protection Agency, Particulate Matter (PM) Research, at http://
www.epa.gov/prnresearch (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
15. See ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D.
Morgenstern ed., Resources for the Future 1997) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT
EPA].
16. See, e.g., Eloise Trabka Castillo et aI., Great Lakes Water Quality Guidance, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note IS, at 419-54; Mahesh Podar et aI., Municipal
Sewage Sludge Management, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note IS, at 365-90;
Todd Ramsden, Vehicle inspection/Maintenance, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra
note IS, at 333-63; Robert C. Anderson and Richard A. Rykowski, Reformulated Gasoline,
in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA,supra note IS, at 391-418.
17. See, e.g., Christine M. Augustyniak, Asbestos, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA,
supra note IS, at 171-203; Peter Caulkins and Stuart Sessions, Water Pollution and the
Organic Chemicals Industry, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note IS, at 87-130;
Leland Deck, Visibility at the Grand Canyon and the Navajo Generating Station, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 15, at 267-301; James K. Hammitt, StratosphericOzone Depletion, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 15, at 131-69.
18. See Sara Rasmussen, Municipal Landfill Management, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT
EPA, supra note 15, at 233-66; see also Louis P. True Jr., Agricultural Pesticides and
Worker Protection, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA,supra note IS, at 303-32.
19. See Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra
note IS, at 205-32; see also Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES
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famous cost-benefit analysis of removing lead from gasoline is the subject
of one of our case studies in this Article. The regulation of lead in drinking
water was almost a sequel to lead in gasoline, addressed by the same
analysts using much of the same data, just a few years later.
Like Morgenstern, we find that cost-benefit analysis played a minor role
in the regulatory processes we evaluate. Furthermore, requiring a positive
cost-benefit analysis before adopting regulations, as currently advocated,
would have prevented some of the great policy successes of the past
decades. Our first example involves removing lead from gasoline.
II. LEAD IN GASOLINE

Whenever proponents of cost-benefit analysis seek to show how it can be
used to protect the environment, they cite the example of EPA's phase
down of lead in gasoline in the 1980s.20 With this rule, the EPA ordered a
large reduction of levels of lead in gasoline. The EPA's decision was
supported by an extensive cost-benefit analysis, which demonstrated that
the benefits of the phase down greatly outweighed the economic costS?1
Such notable regulatory scholars as John Graham,z2 Robert Hahn,23 Richard
Stewart,24 Cass Sunstein,z5 and Jonathan Wiener 6 have pointed to the
influence of cost-benefit analysis on the 1980s-era lead phase down as
evidence of the evenhandedness of this analytical framework.
However, that cost-benefit analysis only appeared in the last act of a long
drama. To summarize the plot in brief: leaded gasoline, introduced in the
1920s despite clear early warnings of severe health hazards, dominated the
market for fifty years?7 Regulations removing most of the lead from
gasoline were finally adopted in the 1970s, and upheld by the courts in a
landmark legal decision. 28 The 1970s regulation was adopted on a

AT EPA, supra note 15, at 49-86.
20. See infra notes 22-25.
21. Nichols, supra note 19.
22. See GEORGE M. GRAY, LAURY SELIGMAN & JOHN D. GRAHAM, The Demise of Lead
in Gasoline, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRY: A RISK MANAGEMENT ApPROACH (John D.
Graham & Jennifer Kassalow Hartwell eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1997).
23. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1523.
24. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1363 (1985); see also Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21, 75 n.45 (2001).
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059,
1071 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, In Praise of Numbers: A Reply, 90 GEO. L.J. 2379,
2384 (2002).
26. Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?, 13 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L.
207,223 (2003).
27. For a comprehensive history of the marketing of, scientific research on, and
eventual regulation of lead in gasoline, see GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT
AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002).
28. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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precautionary basis without reliance on cost-benefit analysis, under the
Clean Air Act's provision giving the EPA the authority to "control or
prohibit" fuel additives if they "will endanger the public health or
welfare.,,29 The EPA's new rule was effective in rapidly lowering blood
lead levels. One convenient side effect was the creation of the data that
later allowed a cost-benefit analysis, in the 1980s, to confirm the wisdom
of staying the course and even going further to remove the last bit of lead
from fuel. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis of the 1980s phase down of lead
in gasoline would not have been possible in the absence of the more
important 1970s-era regulation--which was not itself based on cost-benefit
analysis. Had we waited in the 1970s, as some argue we should do in
policy disputes today, for cost-benefit analysis to show us the way, we
might still be waiting now.
Lead Comes Knocking

Lead was introduced into gasoline in the 1920s, at a time of fierce
competition in the growing market for automobiles. Then as now, two of
the features that could set one car apart from another were power and
speed. Increasing compression in the car engine increases power and
speed, but it can also increase "knocking," or the loss of power
accompanied by the familiar popping sound of very old cars. 30
General Motors (GM) set out to find an anti-knock compound that would
allow its cars to increase their power and speed without increasing
knocking. Thomas Midgley Jr., an engineer in a GM research lab, tested
numerous substances for this purpose--including tetra ethyl lead (TEL).
Pursuin·g the enticing possibility of a substance one could patent (and thus
comer the market in), Midgley shunted to the side another potential antiknock compound, ethanol, in favor of TEL. 31 As Jamie Lincoln Kitman
states in his indispensable account of the development of TEL, "any idiot
with a still" could make ethanol, which made it far less attractive as an antiknock compound to the profit-conscious GM. 32
At the time, GM was controlled by Pierre du Pont, and eventually
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (2000). This provision was amended in 1977 to
allow the agency to regulate fuel additives whenever they "may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger the public health or welfare." /d.
30. See Herbert L. Needleman, History of Lead Poisoning in the World, at
http://www.leadpoison.netigeneral/history.htm (1999) (last visited Oct. 31,2004).
31. Midgley also brought the world another famous compound: chlorofluorocarbons, or
CFCs, later implicated in ozone depletion and banned in a global treaty about the same time
lead was banned in gasoline in the United States. See Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret
History of Lead, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2000, at 5, available at http://www.thenation.
corn/doc.rnhtml?
i=20000320&s=kitman (last visited Jan. 8, 2005);
32. Id. at 6.
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teamed with Standard Oil of New Jersey to form a new company-the
Ethyl Corporation--to market TEL. 33 Even before this development,
plants in Ohio and New Jersey were busy making the chemical. The
problems started immediately. Within the first month of producing TEL, a
worker died at the Ohio plant. 34 Eventually, fifteen workers died, and
hundreds more fell ill.35 Workers called one production facility in New
Jersey the "House of Butterflies" because high lead exposure caused
hallucinations which led workers to swat imaginary insects off of their
bodies. 36
The Surgeon General convened a panel of experts to study the potential
health effects of TEL, but gave them only seven months in which to come
to a conclusion. 3? Ethyl voluntarily suspended production of TEL while the
Surgeon General's committee did its work. 38 The committee did find more
lead in the blood of people occupationally exposed to lead---such as
chauffeurs and garage men--but was unable to find health effects from
these higher exposures within the committee's tight timeline. 39 The
committee ultimately found "no good grounds for prohibiting the use of
ethyl gasoline ... as a motor fuel, provided that its distribution and use are
controlled by proper regulations.,,4o Those "proper regUlations" did not
appear until almost fifty years later. The panel also issued the following
cautionary note:
It remains possible that, if the use of leaded gasolines becomes
widespread, conditions may arise very different from those studied by us
which would render its use more of a hazard than would appear to be the
case from this investigation. Longer experience may show that even
such slight storage oflead as was observed ... [among humans] in these
[1925] studies may lead eventually to recognizable lead poisoning or to
chronic degenerative diseases of a less obvious character .... The vast
increase in the number of automobiles throughout the country makes the
study of all such questions a matter of real importance from the
standpoint of public health.41

It would be many years, however, before anyone took up the issue again.
Within months of the committee's report, TEL was back on the market.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 9.
35. Needleman, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. Kitman, supra note 3l.
38. Id.
39. See Jack Lewis, Lead Poisoning: A Historical Perspective, EPA J. (May 1985),
available at http://www.epa.govlhistory/topics/perspectllead.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(noting that the committee argued that "seven months was 'not sufficient' ... 'to produce
detectable symptoms of lead poisoning"').
40. Id.
41. Id.
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The "Kehoe Rule"
In a 1922 letter to his brother Irenee (the head of DuPont Chemical), GM
chief Pierre du Pont described TEL as "a colorless liquid of sweetish odor,
very poisonous if absorbed through the skin, resulting in lead poisoning
almost immediately.'.42 Yet for the next fifty years, the makers of leaded
gasoline would deny this basic fact: lead is a poison. When faced with the
warnings of public health authorities about the potentially dire effects of
spewing lead into the atmosphere from millions of automobiles, the
industry had a simple response: prove it. 43
It was difficult, however, to prove that the day-to-day, low-level
exposures to lead caused by leaded gasoline hurt people. The kinds of
health effects we now know come from lead --reduced learning capacity,
neurological disorders, and high blood pressure--are quite common, and
have several potential causes which make it difficult to determine which
portion of these effects is due to lead. Thus, although the U.S. government
had suspected the risks of adding lead to gasoline from the very beginning,
it would not seriously try to regulate leaded gasoline until lead had been
pouring from almost every automobile in the country for half a century.
The "prove it's dangerous" approach was dubbed by Jamie Kitman as
the "Kehoe Rule" after Robert Kehoe, the medical director for the Ethyl
Corporation, who pursued and perfected the approach during decades of
asserting the safety of leaded gasoline. The Kehoe Rule was particularly
effective in silencing dissent because most of the lead-related research
conducted in the middle part of the twentieth century was funded by the
44
interested industries themselves. Kehoe maintained that the blood lead
levels of the people most exposed to lead---those who were exposed on the
job--gave little cause for alarm because these levels were not a great deal
higher than the blood lead levels of the presumably unexposed "control"
population. 45
The idea that high levels of lead in the blood were natural, normal, and
benign got its comeuppance from an unlikely source: a geochemist
studying the age of the Earth. Clair Patterson's research on this subject
involved precise chemical analysis of ocean sediments and archaeological
material, which incidentally established that the contemporary body burden
of lead was far above pre-industrial levels. 46 His findings directly refuted
42.

43.
44.
45.

Kitman, supra note 31.
Id.
See id.
See COLLEEN F. MOORE, SILENT SCOURGE: CHILDREN, POLLUTION, AND WHY

SCIENTISTS DISAGREE 18 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (revealing that Kehoe's control
population were people from a remote area of Mexico who used tableware made with lead
glazes and therefore had high levels of lead in their blood).
46. See Clair C. Patterson, Contaminated and Natural Lead Environments of Man, in 11
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Kehoe and the lead industry's claim that the blood lead levels prevailing in
the United States were natural.
Like other scientists who dared to challenge the lead industry's story
line, Patterson found himself at the receiving end of the industry's wrath
and was materially (and adversely) affected by it. 47 Nevertheless, scientific
findings by Patterson and others had begun to chip away at the factual basis
for the industry's longstanding denials of the potential dangers of leaded
gasoline.
Congress Acts

With the passage of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, the
era of leaded gas finally began to draw to a close. The Act directed the
brand new EPA to regulate fuel additives (of which lead was the most
important) if either of two conditions was met. First, Congress directed the
EP A to regulate a fuel additive if the agency found that it "will endanger
the public health or welfare.,,48 Second, the EPA was to do so if the
additive would impair the performance of the pollution control devices that
were also required by the amendments to the Act. 49
A review of the legislative history leading to these developments shows
considerable concern in Congress about the potential dangers of airborne
lead. It also reveals, however, how keenly aware Congress was of the
scientific uncertainty that continued to surround this issue. 50 Perhaps it
goes without saying that Congress performed no cost-benefit analysis of
the consequences of its decision to require regulation of fuel additives;
none would have been possible, given the lack of quantitative data on the
health and welfare effects of leaded gasoline.
Within weeks of the adoption of the amendments,51 the EPA's first
Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, declared that leaded gasoline
endangered the public health and welfare, and impaired the performance of
catalytic converters. Moreover, Ruckelshaus gave public notice that he
intended to issue a regulation reducing allowable levels of lead in
gasoline. 52

ENVTL. HEALTH 344, 358 (1965); see also Ignasi Casanova, Clair Patterson
(1922-95), Discoverer of the Age of the Earth, in I INT'L MICROBIOLOGY No. I 231,231-32

ARCHIVES OF
(1998).

47.
48.

See Kitman, supra note 31.
42 U.S.c. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (1977).

49.

See id.

50. S. REP. No. 91-1196 at 7 (1970), reprinted in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 91sT CONG.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 407 (1974).
51. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were signed into law by President Nixon
on December 31, 1970. Ruckelshaus issued his announcement on Jan. 27, 1971.
52. See Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36 Fed. Reg. 1486 (Jan. 30, 1971) (anticipating
the general availability oflead-free gasoline by July I, 1974).
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In 1972, the EPA proposed a significant reduction in the allowable levels
of lead in gasoline,53 requiring removal of most of the lead within just a
few years. The EPA also proposed to require the availability of at least one
grade of unleaded gasoline. The EPA thought lead would damage the
catalytic converters that were required in new cars in order to reduce other
forms of harmful air pollution. 54 In addition, the EPA thought that lead
itself was a threat to public health. Although the EPA could not put exact
numbers on the health effects caused by lead, it thought the existing
scientific evidence was strong enough to justify strict limits on lead in gas.
The agency stated that the then-existing levels of airborne lead were
"associated with a sufficient risk of adverse physiologic effects to
constitute endangerment of public health.,,55 The EPA concluded that its
proposals to regulate lead would "provide for the protection of health in
major urban areas within the shortest time reasonably possible.,,56
In 1973, the EPA responded to extensive public comments on leaded
gasoline by retreating somewhat from the 1972 proposal. The agency
extended the deadline for the reduction of lead in gasoline and changed the
calculations used to demonstrate refineries' compliance with the agency's
requirements. 57 At the same time, the EPA also softened its earlier claims
about the link between airborne lead levels and public health. The agency
admitted that scientific findings suggesting a correlation between air lead
levels and blood lead levels could not "be taken as conclusive evidence that
airborne lead by itself is a current public health problem.,,58 Even so, the
EPA worried that airborne lead might be contributing to "excessive total
lead exposures among the general urban population.,,59
As noted above, in order to regulate lead in gasoline for purposes of
protecting public health, Congress required the EPA to find only that lead
will "endanger public health or welfare.,,6o The EPA was not required to
perform a cost-benefit analysis of reducing lead in gasoline, and it did not
do so. Indeed, in its 1973 proposal, the EPA admitted that "the benefits
associated with the accelerated lead reduction have not been quantified.,,61

53. See Lead and Phosphorus Additives in Motor Vehicle Gasoline, 37 Fed. Reg. 3882,
3883 (Feb. 23, 1972) (proposing a decrease in the amount of lead in gasoline from 2.0
grams of lead per gallon in January 1974 to 1.25 grams per gallon by January 1977).
54. See id. at 3882 (explaining that the converters under development are likely to be in
general use if lead additives are controlled).
55. Id.
56. ld.
57. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 1258, 1260 (Jan. 10,
1973) (proposing to defer the reduction schedule by one year).
58. ld. at 1259.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (c)(l)(A) (2000).
61. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, supra note 57.
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In December 1973, the EPA issued final regulations on the subject. 62
Large refineries were required to remove roughly 80 percent of the
prevailing (early 1970s) level of lead from gasoline by 1979, and small
refineries had to meet the same target by 1982. 63 The agency explained:
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a precise level of airborne
lead as an acceptable basis for a control strategy.... [However,]
[s]trong evidence existed which supported the view that through these
routes [air and dust] airborne lead contributes to excessive lead exposure
in urban adults and children. In light of this evidence of health risks, the
Administrator concluded that it would be prudent to reduce preventable
lead exposure. 64

The EPA explained that it had extended the deadline for lead reduction
from four to five years in order to "'moderate the economic and
technological impacts of the regulations during the period over which the
reduction would be accomplished. ", The EPA continued: "[T]hough the
benefits associated with the ... lead reductions have not been quantified,
the Administrator has concluded that this approach is not unreasonably
costly and will prudently prevent unnecessary exposure to airborne lead.,,65
Indeed, as Robert Percival and his co-authors have noted, "[ c]osts ... were
projected to be less than 0.1 cent per gallon refined, adding only between
$82 million and $133 million to the total of $1.5 billion the industry was to
invest in refining capacity through the year 1980.,,66
In a hard-fought court battle, the industry tried to resuscitate the Kehoe
rule, arguing that the EPA should not be allowed to regulate unless it could
prove that leaded gasoline had caused actual harm in the past. 67
Nonetheless, the EPA's new restrictions on leaded gasoline were upheld. 68
The court's ultimate holding in the case is considered a landmark in U.S.
environmental law because it established that the EPA could act in a
precautionary fashion, rather than waiting for scientific certainty about the
harmfulness of a substance before acting. 69 The EPA set its standards for
62. Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734 (Dec. 6, 1973).
63. In the early 1970s virtually all gasoline was leaded, with an average of 2.4 grams
per gallon (gpg). The limit for 1979 at large refineries, and 1982 at small ones, was 0.5 gpg.
See Nichols, supra note 19, at 50.
64. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 362 (4th ed. 2003).
65. Id. at 362 n.42.

66.
67.

Id.
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (affirming that

the EPA may show a significant risk of harm rather than the heightened standard of proving
actual harm).
68. See id. at 7 (finding that the Administrator of the EPA properly interpreted the
statute and that the evidence offered during the rulemaking proceeding supported the final
determination).
69. See generally FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW
& POLICY 409 (3d ed. 1999).
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lead based on the goal of protecting children from lead exposures that
would harm their health and cognitive development. 7o
NHANES and Needleman

Around the same time that the EPA's initial lead phase down was taking
effect, additional evidence of the wisdom of the EPA's actions was
accumulating.
The little-remarked National Health Survey Act of 1956 required
periodic national surveys of the population's health.71 This statute, also
enacted without reliance on cost-benefit analysis, led to a national study in
1976-80 of children's blood lead levels.72 The National Health and
Nutrition Examination Study-called NHANES II because it was the
second of its kind--showed marked decreases in children's blood lead
levels in the period examined. 73 Because this period coincided with the
implementation of the EPA's reduction of lead in gasoline, it was possible
to study the relationship between the reduced blood lead levels found in
NHANES II and the reductions in leaded gasoline required by the EPA.
The relationship turned out to be remarkably consistent: children's blood
lead levels declined in direct proportion to the reduction of lead in
gasoline. 74 This relationship became a cornerstone of the EPA's 1980s-era
economic analysis of requiring further reductions in the lead content of
gasoline.
During the same time, Herbert Needleman published his path-breaking
study demonstrating a link between children's blood lead levels and IQ.75
The study answered the question that had dogged lead researchers for
decades: even if blood lead levels were higher than they naturally would
be, was this causing any harm? Needleman's answer was an emphatic yes.
Needleman's study also made it possible to state, in quantitative terms, the
effect of reducing blood lead levels on human health and well being.76
70. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, supra note 57, at 1258-59 (emphasizing
that airborne lead exposure contributes to the abnormally elevated blood levels in urban
adults and children).
71. See 42 U.S.c. § 241 (2000).
72. See The Second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Hematological
and Nutritional Biochemistry Reference Data for Persons 6 Months-764 Years of Age:
United States, 1976-80, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhanes/nh2mn.
htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
73. Id.
74. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT LAKES BINATIONAL TOXICS
STRATEGY, DRAFT REPORT ON ALKYL-LEAD: SOURCES REGULATIONS AND OPTIONS, available
at http://www.epa.gov/grtlakes/bns/lead/steplead.html(last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
75. See H.L. Needleman et aI., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance of
Children with Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689, 689 (1979)
(adding that the children with high lead levels performed worse than children with low lead
levels in verbal tests, auditory and speech processing).
76. See id. at 692-93 (providing quantitative data on lead's effect on verbal processing
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Unfortunately, Needleman suffered the same fate as other lead
researchers before him who had dared take on the lead industry.
Researchers funded by the lead industry challenged his work, going so far
as to press a formal charge of scientific misconduct with the National
Institutes of Health. 77 As Needleman stated in later years, after he had been
completely exonerated, "[i]fyou ever want to be intensively peer-reviewed,
just produce a study with billions of dollars of implications and you will be
reviewed to death.,,78
Meanwhile, the lead industry was also active on another front: with
President Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 after campaign promises to
make government smaller, arguments in favor of relaxing the requirements
for lead in gasoline suddenly gained a more sympathetic hearing. At this
point, cost-benefit analysis did playa useful supporting role in helping
Congress and sympathetic administrators to uphold the previous
commitment to removal of lead from gasoline, despite the wavering of top
Reagan appointees.
Gorsuch Winks

A month after taking office, President Reagan formed the "Task Force
on Regulatory Relief," headed by Vice-President George H.W. Bush. The
ostensible purpose of the Task Force was to coordinate actions among the
various executive agencies and also to oversee compliance with Reagan's
brand-new Executive Order 12291, requiring agencies to conduct costbenefit analyses for significant new regulatory initiatives. 79 The real aim of
the Task Force was to reduce regulation any way possible. 80
One of the first actions to come within the sights of the Task Force was
the EPA's lead phase down. 8l The phase down was nearly, but not quite,
complete: although the EPA had required large refineries to meet its new
limits by 1979, small refineries were given until 1982 to do SO.82 In 1982,
following a Task Force recommendation, EPA not only proposed to delay
and IQ, and comparing the manner in which teacher's rate the behavior of children with
high and low blood lead levels).
77. See DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER: TALES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DECEPTION AND THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION 128 (Basic Books 2002) (observing "[i]t
was not known then that their [Needleman's accusers] work was supported by the lead
industries").
78. Id. at 127.
79. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary to the Vice-President, Statement of
the Vice-President Regarding an Executive Order Signed Today by the President
Concerning Regulatory Management (Feb. 17, 1981), at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers
!Reagan. htm. (last visited Dec. 16,2004).
80. See Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget

Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
12,291,4 VA. 1. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1,43 (1984).
81. See DAVIS, supra note 77, at 130.
82. See Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, supra note 62, at 33,740.
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the requirement for small refineries,83 but also invited public comment on
whether to relax the requirements for large refineries as well. 84
Reagan's EPA Administrator at the time, Ann Gorsuch, appears to have
been on the same page as the Task Force. During a meeting with Ethyl
representatives, she was asked whether she would enforce the existing rules
to phase down lead. Her reported response: she winked. 85
Nevertheless, the public outcry over news that the phase down might be
weakened made the EPA back off from its proposals. Eventually, the
1970s-era rules were tightened rather than relaxed,86 and a federal court
upheld the new rules almost in their entirety, even going so far as to opine
that a complete ban on lead in gasoline would be justified. 87
By March 1983, Gorsuch had resigned amidst a scandal arising out of
the Superfund hazardous waste program. One EPA official was sent to jail
for lying to Congress about the matter. 88 Over a thousand EPA employees
had lost their jobs early on in the Reagan administration,89 and the
remaining employees' morale had hit an all-time low. It was time to
restore credibility to the embattled agency.

Ruckelshaus and Cost-Benefit to the Rescue
Just weeks after Gorsuch resigned, EPA's first Administrator, William
Ruckelshaus, returned to the agency in its time of need. One of his stated
aims was to restore rigorous analysis and to displace the political forces
that had recently dominated the agency's actions. 90 Alvin AIm, his deputy,
later recalled that at the time the agency was "really in need of some help,"
and that the agency's new leaders needed to "creat[e] confidence that we
were getting work done. ,.9l
It is only at this late date in the story that cost-benefit analysis made its
famous, and helpful, appearance. Within six months of the regime change
at the agency, AIm asked EPA's economics office (the Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation) to put together a preliminary cost-benefit analysis

83. See Fuel and Fuel Additives; Proposed Suspension of Compliance Date for Small
Refineries, 47 Fed. Reg. 7814 (Feb. 22, 1982).
84. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 7812 (Feb. 22, 1982).
85. See DAVIS, supra note 77, at 130.
86. See Nichols, supra note 19, at 50-52.
87. See Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
88. See DAVIS, supra note 77, at 130.
89. /d.
90. See W.D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 SCI. 1026 (1983).
91. For the oral history of Alvin Aim, see Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
History, at http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/alml21.htm (last visited Nov. 13,2004);
see also Environmental Protection Agency, EPA History, at http://www.epa.gov/history/
publications/alml22.htm (last visited Nov. 12,2004).
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of further regulation of lead in gasoline, including an outright ban.92 As
Albert Nichols, who became intimately involved with the eventual analysis,
recalled, AIm became interested in reviving the lead issue because of a
remark by a lobbyist for the ethanol industry (ethanol was a potential
substitute for lead),93 and also because "lead appeared to offer an
opportunity to demonstrate that the risk management principles being
promoted by Administrator William Ruckelshaus and AIm were not just a
sophisticated way of saying 'no' to proposed regulations; they also could
help identify cases in which additional regulation was justified.,,94
Although Albert Nichols' account of the EPA's decision to do a costbenefit analysis of further lead reductions states that EPA "was not under
significant pressure from... environmental groups to take additional
action,,,95 Nichols also acknowledges, in a footnote, that "[o]ther prominent
environmentalists--such as Ellen Silbergeld of the Environmental Defense
Fund-bad been active for many years in efforts to reduce lead.,,96 Others
recall a more prominent role for environmental groups, in particular the
Environmental Defense Fund, in persuading EPA to take another look at
lead. Robert Percival, now a professor of law at the University of
Maryland but then a young attorney at the Environmental Defense Fund,
suggested during a meeting with Alvin AIm in the fall of 1983 that the EPA
undertake a cost-benefit analysis of phasing out lead from gasoline. 97
Several years later, AIm wrote that one of EPA's most important
achievement~he 1980s-era phase down of lead in gasoline----had "come
about through a chance encounter" with someone he did not know, who
had suggested doing a cost-benefit analysis of further lead regulation. 98
Whatever the origins of AIm's request, EPA's analysts complied,
producing a cost-benefit analysis clearly demonstrating that additional
regulation of leaded gasoline was amply justified in economic terms.
Armed with this analysis, the EPA not only upheld the original rule, but
adopted a new rule in 1985 that went much farther, requiring the removal
by 1988 of about 90 percent of the lead that was still allowed in gasoline
under the 1970s rule. 99 By this time, EPA felt confident enough to be able
92. Nichols, supra note 19, at 53.
93. /d.; see also personal communication between Lisa Heinzerling and Joel Schwartz
(Mar. 4, 2004) (source of specific reference to the ethanol lobbyist).
94. Nichols, supra note 19, at 53.
95. /d. at 52-53.
96. Id. at 83 & n.!.
97. Email from Bob Percival to Lisa Heinzerling (Mar. 15,2004) (on file with authors).
98. Alvin Aim, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible Dream?,
MULTIMEDIA ApPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 114, 115
(Nat'l Research Council 1987).
99. Under a new method of calculation, the lead level allowed under the 1973 rule was
now measured as l.l gpg (corresponding to 0.5 gpg under the old method, as cited in note
41, supra). See Nichols, supra note 19, at 51-52. The 1985 rule required reduction to 0.1
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to include in its final economic analysis enormous benefits from reducing
blood pressure in men through phasing out lead in gasoline. These benefits
alone, the EPA predicted, would be about ten times higher than the total
costs of the rule by the late 1980s. 100

Crunching the Numbers
The second wave of reduction of lead in gasoline, required by the EPA
in the 1980s, is the example widely touted as evidence that cost-benefit
analysis is a neutral decisionmaking tool, tilting in favor of neither
regulation nor laissez faire.
However, the cost-benefit analysis performed by the EPA in the 1980s
could not have been performed if the regulation of the 1970s, the ensuing
"first wave" removal of roughly 80 percent of the lead in gasoline, and the
government-sponsored national survey of blood lead levels had not already
occurred. EPA's cost-benefit analysis depended crucially on evidence
gained from the studies showing a strong relationship between reduction of
lead in gasoline and reduction in blood lead levels in children. This
evidence was available only because regulation had already achieved such
a substantial reduction of lead in gasoline. It is indeed useful that the lead
cost-benefit analysis helped to prevent backsliding in the early years of the
Reagan administration, and even justified the rapid removal of most of the
remaining lead from gasoline. But this is very different from doing the job
alone, or even playing the leading role.
Moreover, the story of cost-benefit analysis in supporting lead regulation
stands almost alone: it is so universally cited that a skeptical observer
might ask, is there a second example of cost-benefit methods being used to
support environmental protection? According to participants in the studies,
the cost-benefit analysis of leaded gasoline and the subsequent study of
lead in drinking water (done just a few years later by the same analysts,
using much of the same data) were "anomalous" successes, drawing on
unusually strong data sets and enjoying a clear mandate from above to
support protective regulations. lOl Normally, of course, it is not possible to
remove most of a pollutant from the environment, in order to develop the
data supporting the removal of the remainder. And the political and
administrative support for regulation that existed when Ruckelshaus
returned to the EPA in the mid-1980s has been sadly lacking in the opening
years of the twenty-first century.102
gpg under the new method of calculation. See id. at 57-62.
100. Jd. at 74 tb1.3.
101. Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra
note 15, at 230.
102. See, among many other sources, ROBERT S. DEVINE, BUSH VERSUS THE
ENVIRONMENT (Anchor Books 2004).
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In different hands, with a different political agenda, the cost-benefit
analysis of lead regulation could have looked quite different. Recently, one
prominent regulatory analyst has shown how this might have happened.
Randall Lutter, formerly at OMB and now chief economist at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), was, between government jobs, ensconced at
the American Enterprise Institute, where he frequently wrote on the
supposed dangers of over-protection against hazardous substances.
Regarding lead, Lutter proposed to rethink the approach to the benefits of
lead reduction. Rather than indirectly valuing the immense health
improvements and the gains in children's IQ that have been traced to lead
reductions, as EPA has done, Lutter argued that society should not value
lead removal any more highly than individuals dO. I03 Moreover, he
suggested that individual valuations could be determined from studying
what parents spend on a medical treatment called chelation therapy to
lower their children's lead levels. Since chelation is proven to work only
for very high levels of lead poisoning,l04 there is, unsurprisingly, little
evidence that people choose to spend money on it for more common,
chronic low-level lead problems. Applying the chelation yardstick, Lutter
found that the EPA had overstated the benefits of lead reduction, perhaps
by as much as eight-fold. 105 In Lutter's view, therefore, less protective
expenditure would be warranted--and the historic role of cost-benefit
analysis in supporting lead reduction could have been less important.
Thus, it is not only the strong data and robust empirical studies that
allowed cost-benefit analysis to support environmental protection in this
case. Also crucial was the political support for a methodology that valued
benefits relatively expansively. A different methodology, like Lutter's,
could point in the opposite direction. The use of cost-benefit analysis by an
Administration hostile to environmental protection will almost certainly not
produce the equivalent of another lead phase down.
III. DAMMING THE GRAND CANYON

Leave it as it is. You cannot improve on it. The ages have been at work
on it, and man can only mar it. ... What you can do is to keep it for your
children, your children's children, and for all who come after you, as one

103. Randall Lutter, Valuing Children's Health: A Reassessment of the Benefits of Lower
Lead Levels (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 00-02,2000),
available at http://www.aei.brookings.orgipublications/workinglworking0002.pdf. (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005).
104. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REpORT 6 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS: LEAD POISONING AMONG CHILDREN (Dec. 1994), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/13681.html (last visited Jan. 10,2005).
105. Lutter, supra note 103, at 6.
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of the great sights which every American if he can travel at all should
see. 106
What's so special about the Grand Canyon anyway?107

The water wars of the arid American West have transformed the natural
landscape. With the help of countless billions of public dollars, the region's
meager supplies of water have been rerouted to allow agriculture, industry,
and residential development to flourish on barren desert lands, as described
by Marc Reisner in his classic account, Cadillac Desert. 108 At times, the
"water wars" have almost ceased to be metaphorical. In 1934, Arizona
mobilized its National Guard in an attempt to stop construction of a dam
that would divert Colorado River water into California. l09
In the 1960s, collateral damage in the water wars nearly claimed parts of
the Grand Canyon, as huge dams were proposed 'on the Colorado River,
just above and below the national park. I 10 The dams were defeated in part
by the massive opposition organized by the Sierra Club and other
environmentalists-and in part by an influential cost-benefit analysis
performed by RAND Corporation economists, showing that the economic
benefits of the dams were slightly less than the costs.
This could be considered a triumph for the environmentally benign use
of cost-benefit analysis, except for one drawback: the RAND analysis is, in
retrospect, absurd.
The same methodology combined with better
information, which became available just a few years later, would have led
to the opposite conclusion and firmly endorsed the dams.
Razing Arizona
The Colorado River is one of the few major sources of water in Arizona,
skirting the northern and western edges of the state. Most of the
agriculture, industry, and people in Arizona are hundreds of miles away,
many of them in and around Phoenix and Tucson, and separated from the
river by mountains as well as desert. The proposed damming of the Grand
Canyon arose as part of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), a colossal
scheme to move water from the river to the people. III
106. President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at the Grand Canyon (May 6, 1903), quoted
in http://www.theodoreroosevelt.orglkidscorner/Grand_Canyon.htm (last visited Jan. 3,
2005).
107. Videotape: Grand Canyon, The Price of Power (The Sierra Club 1992), quoted in
Clayton L. Riddle, Protecting the Grand Canyon National Park from Glen Canyon Dam:
Environmental Law at its Worst, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 115, 115 (1993).
108. MARc REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 2,2-3 (Viking Penguin 1986). Except as otherwise noted, Reisner is the source for
the following account of the Central Arizona Project and related background information.
109. Id. at 267-68.
110. Jd. at 283.
Ill. See supra note 108.
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After decades of battles in the courts and in Congress (as well as the
armed confrontation at the riverbank in 1934), Arizona finally won a legal
entitlement to a significant share of the Colorado River's water in the early
1960s. This cleared the way for the Central Arizona Project, proposed
years earlier, to proceed. However, the effort needed multi-bill ion-dollar
financing to build its enormous aqueducts, and huge amounts of energy to
pump the water up over the mountains. 112
The Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency that dammed so many
western rivers, had been "solving" problems like this since the 1940s. Its
preferred method was called "river-basin accounting," treating the
development of a river and related waterworks as a single project.
Profitable dams could be built on fast-flowing rivers, generating
hydroelectric power that would finance money-losing irrigation and water
diversion schemes, as well as powering the massive pumping stations
required to move the water. If the projects in a river basin were unbundled,
the logic of the market might dictate building the dams but skipping the
irrigation and other unprofitable pieces of the picture. However, the federal
government repeatedly bought the whole package deal, as the New Deal
enthusiasm for big public construction projects meshed with the local
interests of Western politicians---many of them ideologically opposed to
expensive public-sector initiatives that benefited anyone else. 113
By the time the Central Arizona Project began, most of the best sites on
the Colorado had been taken for earlier developments. The only remaining
options for big, profitable "cash register dams" that would finance the
project were the Marble Gorge (or Marble Canyon) Dam and the Bridge
Canyon Dam, later renamed Hualapai Dam to "honor" a Native American
community. Marble Gorge, just upstream from the Grand Canyon National
Park, would have flooded the Inner Gorge, essentially the first 40 miles of
the river's course through the canyon. Hualapai, downstream from the
National Park, would have created a 94-mile-Iong reservoir, entirely
flooding the Grand Canyon National Monument and extending 13 miles
into the National Park itself. 114
Both dams were included in the revised CAP proposal, launched in 1963.
In support of the proposal, the Bureau of Reclamation performed an
economic analysis comparing the dams to thermal (fossil fuel) power
plants; the result was that the dams were much cheaper, with benefit/cost
ratios of 2.0 and 1.7. 115 These numbers emerged from a variant of cost112. See supra note 108.
113. See REISNER, supra note 108, at 267-68.
114. See supra note 108.
115. See Alan Carlin, The Grand Canyon Controversy: Lessons for Federal Cost-Benefit
Practices, 5 tbl.1 (RAND Corp. 1967) [hereinafter Lessons for Federal Cost-Benefit
Practices] (citing United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of RecIamation, "Pacific
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benefit analysis that is common in evaluation of power plants. The analysis
assumed that if the dams were not built, something else would have to be
built to generate the same amount of electricity. Thus the "benefit" of
building the dams is that it would avoid the construction of the next-best
alternative--which was a thermal power plant, according to the Bureau of
Reclamation. A benefit/cost ratio of 2.0 for a dam means that the
"benefit," i.e., the avoided cost of an equivalent power plant, is twice the
cost of the dam.
In the Bureau's analysis, almost nothing was said about recreational
benefits, and no mention was made of the value of the existence of the
Grand Canyon per se (what environmental economists now call "existence
value" or other varieties of "non-use value"). The analysis simply
compared the two methods of generating electricity. Although referred to
at the time as a cost-benefit analysis, this might be better described as a
cost-effectiveness analysis, seeking the minimum-cost way to meet the goal
of generating a fixed amount of electricity. I 16 The Bureau's result, strongly
favoring the dams, is not a surprising one. Hydroelectric facilities built at
places where large rivers are flowing rapidly downhill-like the Marble
Canyon and Bridge Canyon site~are routinely among the lowest-cost
sources of electricity. If nothing of importance is lost due to the creation of
the reservoir or other changes in river flow, hydroelectric development on
fast-flowing major rivers is frequently a profitable way to generate electric
power.
Yet many people naturally felt that something of great importance would
be lost. The Sierra Club quickly organized widespread, vocal opposition to
the dams, easily winning the war for public opinion. Defenders of the
dams suggested that the elevated water level of the Hualapai reservoir
would allow more visitors to see the canyon from tour boats; the Sierra
Club asked if we should also flood the Sistine Chapel so that tourists could
get closer to the ceiling. I 17 Soon thereafter, the IRS revoked the Sierra
Club's tax-exempt status.ll8

Southwest Water Plan, Supplemental Information, Report on Marble Canyon Project,
Arizona," Jan. 1964, p. 24); see also United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation, "Pacific Southwest Water Plan, Supplemental Information Report on Bridge
Canyon Project," Jan. 1964, p. 22.
116. The strength of cost-effectiveness analysis is that it avoids the problems of
valuation of non-marketed benefits, such as the existence of the Grand Canyon; it only
compares the market costs of alternative means of reaching a single, specified goal. The
corresponding limitation is that cost-effectiveness analysis says nothing about the
importance of its goal versus other goals. In the case of the Grand Canyon, the relative
importance of generating electricity versus preserving the Canyon is the crucial omitted
factor that led many people to reject the Bureau's analysis.
117. REISNER, supra note 108, at 296.
118. See id. at 297.
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Too Cheap to Meter

After four years of debate, the dams were defeated in 1967. While love
of nature in general and the Grand Canyon in particular played an essential
role, the Sierra Club and other opponents of the dams did not win on
environmental arguments alone. Also crucial to the outcome was a rival
cost-benefit analysis by two RAND Corporation economists, Alan Carlin
and William Hoehn. 119 Their work was publicized by the Sierra Club and
by Congressional opponents of the dams; it was presented and debated at
length in the Congressional hearings on the issue. 120 Using a methodology
much like the Bureau of Reclamation analysis, Carlin and Hoehn compared
the dams to the cheapest alternative source of electricity; they again
included almost nothing for the value of recreation, environmental amenity,
or the existence of the Grand Canyon. But Carlin and Hoehn used a
different alternative source of power as their benchmark. They compared
the dams to nuclear power plants, which they believed to be astonishingly
cheap.
Although their predictions of nuclear costs turned out to be hopelessly
below the mark, Carlin and Hoehn did no worse than most people writing
about nuclear power in the mid-1960s. At the time, nuclear power was a
relatively new idea, still on the verge of commercial application. The
hazards of nuclear power were not yet well known; the escalating costs of
nuclear plants were not yet in sight. Instead, industry and government
boosters of the new technology promoted the notion that nuclear energy
would soon be "too cheap to meter.,,121 A decade of intensive research and
development in the 1950s, mostly government-sponsored, had led to the
first orders for nuclear plants in the early 1960s-and to wild optimism

119. Lessons for Federal Cost-Benefit Practices, supra note 115, cites the original
figures and presents intermediate revisions for Marble Canyon based on more reasonable
assumptions about nuclear reactor operations. The final variant charged Hualapai, in
particular, for the large water losses due to evaporation from its reservoir, and made other
technical changes, as described by Alan Carlin & William Hoehn in The Grand Canyon
Controversy-1967: Further Economic Comparisons of Nuclear Alternatives (RAND Corp.
1967) [hereinafter Further Economic Comparisons]. The Carlin-Hoehn analysis was
spelled out in a series of reports, all from RAND, including, in addition to the two just cited,
Alan Carlin & William Hoehn, Is the Marble Canyon Project Economically Justified?
(1966) [hereinafter Marble Canyon Project]; Hoehn, What the Parsons Study Really Says
About Nuclear Power Economics: The Grand Canyon Controversy. Round? (1967); and
Carlin, The Grand Canyon Controversy or How Reclamation Justifies the Unjustifiable
(1967) [hereinafter How Reclamation Justifies the Unjustifiable] (providing a retrospective
on the controversy).
120. See the statements by Alan Carlin, and extensive discussion of his views, in the
Hearing on the "Lower Colorado River Basin Project" of the Subcommittee on Irrigation
and Reclamation of the US Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1468-539
(1966).
121. STEVEN MARK COHN, Too CHEAP TO METER: AN ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 107 (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1997).
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about the future of the technology.122 Almost half of the plants ordered
during 1964-66, the years just before and during the Carlin-Hoehn analysis,
were sold on fixed-price terms, with substantial subsidies from vendors
seeking to increase their share of an exploding new market. 123 The average
plant being ordered in those years was more than three times the size of any
that had yet been built, accompanied by exaggerated hopes about the
declining costs that would come with growth. 124
In 1967 the federal Atomic Energy Commission predicted that there
would be 1,000 nuclear plants in operation by the year 2000, a prediction
that turned out to be almost ten times too high.125 While 196 nuclear plants
were ordered by electric utilities between 1967 and 1974, many of the later
orders were cancelled. 126 After 1974, the energy crisis led to an abrupt halt
to the growth in demand for electricity, and hence diminished interest in
building new plants. Meanwhile, the seemingly endless series of hazards,
accidents, and near-misses at nuclear plants led to one expensive
requirement for redesign after another. Each safety problem appeared to be
controllable, at an additional cost-with the result that costs were steadily
driven upward. 127
A recent analysis of nuclear power offers a retrospective evaluation of
early cost forecasts:
The magnitude of nuclear cost forecasting errors [before 1970] was
extraordinary. Nuclear plants persistently cost about twice the inflation
adjusted price predicted when they were purchased. The last forty-three
plants coming on line in the U.S. (1983-present) cost ... more than six
times the constant dollar sum projected in the mid-sixties, and generate
electricity at . . . more than five times the average rate predicted from
1963-1972. 128

What the RAND analysis of the Grand Canyon essentially did was to
compare the proposed dams to new reactors at 1960s fantasy prices. The
result was that the reactors were slightly--not enormously--cheaper, so
that the dams narrowly failed the cost-benefit test. In the first version of
the Carlin-Hoehn analysis, the Marble Canyon dam had a benefit-cost ratio
of 0.95 (that is, a reactor at fantasy prices was just five percent cheaper
than the dam), while Hualapai had a ratio of 0.86 (a reactor beat this dam
by 14 percent).129 Subsequent revisions lowered the ratios; in what appears
122. See id. at 46-47.
123. See id. at 45-46.
124. See id. at 45-47.
125. See id. at 110.
126. COHN, supra note 121, at 127.
127. !d. at 93-95.
128. Id. at 104-05.
129. See Lessons for Federal Cost-benefit Practices, supra note 119, at 5 tbl.l
(documenting their original estimates).
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to be the final version, published after the dams had been defeated, the
ratios were 0.76 for Marble Canyon and 0.61 for Hualapai.J3O
Even the Sierra Club was briefly disoriented by the mirage of the cheap
nuclear alternative. As David Brower, the head of the Sierra Club at the
time, stated in an interview recalling the battle over the Grand Canyon,
"Alan Carlin, who was of the Rand Corporation, an economist, began to
feed numbers into the system that were devastating. The principal
argument that Larry Moss [a nuclear engineer working for the Sierra Club]
was coming up with was we could go to nuclear instead. I was trapped in
that briefly, but got out of that trap."l3l At the height of the debate, in the
Sierra Club Bulletin of May 1966-described as the "Grand Canyon
issue"--editor Hugh Nash wrote, in arguing against the dams:
Cheaper electricity is available from other sources ... A nuclear power
plant in New Jersey will produce power for 4 mills (compared with the
dam's 5.3 mills) by 1969 .... Proponents of the dams try to make out
that nuclear power is still pie in the sky. Not so. The TVA has contracted
for a nuclear powerplant which ... will generate power for only 2.37
mills per kilowatt-hour. 132
The RAND cost-benefit analysis involves many technical details;
however, the decisive economic data are the capital costs of constructing
the dams, on the one hand, and equivalent-sized nuclear plants, on the
other. In each case the huge one-time costs are converted to annual
charges, assuming that the construction costs will be paid back over the
lifetime of the facility-just as a mortgage converts the one-time cost of
buying a house to a series of payments over many years. In the RAND
analysis, the "mortgage payments" on the construction cost amount to twothirds or more of the annual cost of owning and operating either the dams
or the nuclear plants.
In the final revision of their analysis of the dams, Carlin and Hoehn
estimated the capital cost of building the dams, in 2003 dollars, at a total of
$4.27 billion, or $2,186 per kilowatt of electrical generating capacity.133
130. See supra note 111.
131. Interview by Brad Dimock, Jeri Ledbetter, and Lew Steiger with David Brower,
former Executive Director, Sierra Club, in 10 BOATMAN'S Q. REv. No.3 (1997), available
at http://www.gcrg.orglhqr/l0-3/10-3bqr.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
132. Hugh Nash, Other Arguments Against Dams in Grand Canyon and Why Grand
Canyon Should Not Be Dammed, 51 SIERRA CLUB BULL. No.5, 1966, at 5, 9. A mill is onetenth of a cent. Id. Assuming the quoted costs are in 1966 dollars per kilowatt-hour, and
updating them with the consumer price index, the first two are equivalent to 2.3 cents per
kilowatt-hour for nuclear power, compared with 3.0 cents for the dams, at 2003 prices. /d.
The TVA nuclear cost is equivalent to 1.4 cents per kilowatt-hour at 2003 prices. Id. Nash
and other Sierra Club writers, of course, spent much more time and effort on making the
environmental case against the dams and describing their impact on the Grand Canyon. Id.
133. Further Economic Comparisons, supra note 119, at 15 tbl.2, 1.8, cols.l & 3. The
number in the text is a weighted average of the cost per kilowatt at each dam, weighted in
proportion to their proposed capacities (1350 MW for Hualapai, 600 MW for Bridge

HeinOnline -- 57 Admin. L. Rev. 178 2005

2005]

WAS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EVER A GOOD/DEA?

179

The capital cost of equivalent nuclear power plants, they thought, would be
less than a third as much: about $1.3 billion total, or a mere $665 per
kilowatt of capacity.134 The Carlin-Hoehn prediction of nuclear costs is
very much in line with other forecasts from the mid-1960s, as seen in the
graph, below. Forecasts from that era averaged $657 per kilowatt, virtually
identical to the Carlin-Hoehn guess. 135 That is to say, the RAND study
appeared to rely on the "sound science" of its day, but failed to
notice--along with most of its contemporaries--that that "science" was
unusually reliant on wishful thinking rather than hard data.

Nuclear Plant Capital Costs:
Predicted, 1963-74, and actual, 1983-present
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Canyon), converted from 1966 dollars to 2003 dollars using the GDP deflator. Id.
134. Id. at 15 tb1.2, notes to 1.1, cols.2 & 4. Weighted average and conversion to 2003
dollars as in the previous note. /d. Although the construction costs were projected to be
three times as large for the dams as for the nuclear plants, the benefit/cost ratios are not
equally lopsided, both because the dams have lower operating costs, and because the dams
would be expected to last longer and therefore could spread their capital costs out over
many more years. Id.
135. Data in Figure 1, other than the RAND forecast, are from COHN, supra note 121, at
105 tbI.4.3, converted to 2003 dollars using the GDP deflator as in the previous calculations.
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The analysis of the Grand Canyon occurred just before the rapid
escalation in the costs of nuclear power. Between 1969-72, forecasts of
nuclear costs rose more than 25 percent, to $838 per kilowatt;136 even this
moderate increase would have eliminated most or all of the projected
economic advantages of nuclear power over the dams. Two years later, in
1973-74, forecasts of nuclear costs had jumped to $1538 per kilowatt, more
than double the mid-1960s level. 137 Redoing the RAND analysis with this
figure would clearly reverse the benefit/cost ratio. Consequently, using the
cost estimates available six to eight years after the RAND study, the same
methodology would end up agreeing with the Bureau of Reclamation (and
common sense) that big dams are the cheapest way to generate electricity,
if that is all that matters.
Furthermore, as the graph shows, nuclear costs continued to rise well
beyond the level of the 1973-74 forecasts.
The last plants
completed--those that came on line in 1983 or later--had average capital
costs of$4,586 per kilowatt, almost seven times the RAND estimate. 138
An Expensive Aqueduct Runs Through It
The dams were defeated, but not the Central Arizona Project which they
were supposed to finance. Indeed, the CAP was approved by Congress,
without dams or other visible revenue sources, in 1968. 139 The aqueduct is
336 miles long and 80 feet wide. 140 Construction started in 1973 and
finished in 1993 at a cost of over $4 billion, of which $1.6 billion will be
paid back to the federal government by users over the first 50 years of
operation. 141 Unless water levels are above average, the Colorado River
may not have enough water for all the commitments that have been made to
Arizona, other states, and Mexico; the water that is supposed to flow
through the expensive aqueduct may not always be there. 142
As if taking the RAND analysis to heart, the huge Palo Verde nuclear
plant was built in Arizona, planned within a few years of the defeat of the
dams. 143 Construction began in 1976 and finished in 1988. 144 The cost,
136. COHN, supra note 121, at 105 tbL4.3. Data in Figure 1 has been converted to 2003
dollars using the GDP deflator as in the previous calculations.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 104. Ali costs cited here have been converted to 2003 dollars, so these
increases are not due to inflation.
139. REISNER, supra note 108, at 300-01.
140. For a detailed description of the aqueduct, see the Central Arizona Project (CAP)
website, at http://www.cap-az.comlfaq (last visited Jan. 10,2005).
141. For a detailed description of the CAP, see http://www.capaz.comlahout/
index.cfm?action=history&subsection=5 (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
142. See CAP website, at http://www.cap-az.comlfaq (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).
143. REISNER, supra note 108.
144. See information relating to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, at
http://www.srpnet.comlabout/stations/paloverde.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
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according to the plant's operators, was $2608 per kilowatt in 2003 dollars,
or aimost four times the RAND projection. 145 At this price, needless to say,
nuclear power was more expensive by far than the dams would have been,
and also more expensive than the thermal power plants which the Bureau
of Reclamation offered as the next-best alternative to the dams.
In the end, the Grand Canyon was preserved for future generations to
see, as Theodore Roosevelt urged. In the more prosaic present, however,
there were large numbers of people who wanted water and electricity
provided in an inhospitable environment. Damming the Grand Canyon was
unmistakably the cheapest, but not the best, way to provide these services
to central Arizona. (Important questions about the wisdom, and the
sustainability, of urban development in the midst of a desert lie just beyond
the scope of this discussion.)
The RAND analysis that was instrumental in saving the Grand Canyon
was right for the wrong reasons, erring spectacularly in favor of one
environmental objective only by drastically underestimating another
environmental problem. A cost-benefit analysis of the Grand Canyon
performed today would include new categories of non-use value: What is
the mere existence of the Grand Canyon worth to people who mayor may
not use or visit it?146 What is the value of the opportunity to pass it on to
the next generation?147 Yet the calculation of huge existence values for
unique natural wonders such as the Grand Canyon introduces a new set of
problems into cost-benefit analysis. Estimates of these values differ
widely, with similar survey questions about the dollar value of major
national parks eliciting answers that differ by almost 100 to I between one
academic study and the next. 148 Existence values are important, but they do
not bear much resemblance to prices; they are real, but "they are not really
numbers.,,149
If you support the preservation of the Grand Canyon, how would you
react to a study showing that the benefits of the Canyon, including its
existence value to the American people, were 20 percent lower than the
benefits of damming it for hydroelectric development? Would you accept
this as scientific proof that the Grand Canyon should in fact be dammed,
despite your personal preferences? Or would you insist that the value of its
145. Id. The construction reportedly cost $5.9 billion. Id. The plant's capacity is 3810
MW, implying an average cost of $1549 per kilowatt. Id. Because construction began in
June 1976 and ended in January 1988, it seems likely that the construction cost is reported
in mixed-year historical dollars, with an average vintage of about 1982. Jd. In the text, the
reported figure has been converted from 1982 to 2003 dollars using the GOP deflator. Id.
146. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note I, at 176-77.
147. Id. at 178.
148. V. Kerry Smith & Laura L. Osborne, Do Contingent Valuation Estimates Pass a
'Scope' Test? A Meta-Analysis, 311. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 287, 291 (1996).
149. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note I, at 178.
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existence must have been underestimated, because you know that it is
worth more than that? The fonner answer is difficult to imagine, but the
latter implies that there is no empirical infonnation conveyed by estimates
of existence value. Rather, existence values offer only an awkward
translation of independently established conclusions into the artificially
constrained language of economics.
The cost-benefit analysts of the 1960s, of course, knew nothing about the
theoretical dilemmas and measurement problems surrounding existence
values. It is fortunate, in retrospect, that they knew equally little about the
economics of nuclear power.
IV. VINYL CHLORIDE IN THE WORKPLACE

There is little dispute that [vinyl chloride] is carcinogenic to man and we
so conclude. However, the precise level of exposure which poses a
hazard and the question of whether a 'safe' exposure level exists cannot
be definitively answered on the record. Nor is it clear to what extent
exposures can be feasibly reduced. We cannot wait until indisputable
answers to these questions are available, because lives of employees are
at stake. 150
That some must die so that all can eat is one thing; that some must die so
that all can have see-through food packaging is another. 151

Polyvinyl chloride, also known as vinyl or PVC, is a ubiquitous plastic,
used in plumbing, siding, toys, medical equipment, and countless other
productS. 152 Vinyl chloride, the chemical building block from which PVC
is made, is a known human carcinogen. 153 Since vinyl chloride can be
emitted, either in plants where it is made or where it is used to make PVC,
workers in those plants are at risk of hazardous exposures on the job. 154
In 1974 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
adopted a strict new standard that sharply reduced allowable workplace

150. Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, Occupational Safety and Health
Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890,35,892 (Oct. 4, 1974) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 1910.1017).
151. David D. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the
Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 521 (1978), reprinted in
DAVID D. DONIGER, THE LAW AND POLICY OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL 22 (Resources
for the Future 1978).
152. See generally Frank Ackennan & Rachel Massey, The Economics of Phasing Out
PVC I (Global Development and Environmental Institute 2003), available at
http://www.ase.tufts.edulgdae/publications/articiesJeports/index.html(last visited Jan. 10,
2005).
153. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, REpORT ON CARCINOGENS, 10th ed., at
http://ehp.niehs.nih.govlroc/tenthlintro.pdf(last visited Jan. 10,2004).
154. See Michael S. Brown, Setting Occupational Health Standards: The Vinyl Chloride
Case, in CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS 130-146 (Dorothy Nelkin ed.,
Sage Publications 1992).
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exposure to vinyl chloride. 155 Consistent with its governing statute, the
agency did not justify the rule on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.
Rather, the strict exposure limit was based on the level OSHA determined
industry could meet--<>r, in the words of the statute, the "feasible" limit. 156
The agency acted in response to a series of deaths attributable to vinyl
chloride exposure, combined with disturbing new information on
carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride in laboratory animals. OSHA acted on
precautionary grounds, taking action when evidence of harm began to
appear without waiting for precise, definitive quantification of the expected
effects.
In the years since then, data have accumulated to confirm the toxicity of
low doses of vinyl chloride, and on the range of organs affected by vinyl
chloride exposures. These data have repeatedly confirmed the wisdom of
OSHA's action. It is clear in retrospect that OSHA was right to regulate
vinyl chloride exposure strictly. But what would have happened if OSHA
had used cost-benefit analysis to make its decision, using the data that were
available at that time? If performed in the manner favored today, such an
analysis would have guided OSHA in the wrong direction, justifying little
if any regulatory action.
Incriminating Evidence

Laboratory experiments documented the toxicity of vinyl chloride as
early as 1925, and a range of adverse effects were documented in people in
the 1930s and 1940s. 157 In the 1950s, Dow Chemical found that inhalation
exposure to vinyl chloride damaged the liver and kidneys of laboratory
animals; the company took steps to decrease employees' exposures, but did
not inform them of the hazard. ISS Two men died after acute inhalation
exposure to vinyl chloride in 1960. 159 In the mid-1960s, industry
researchers found that many vinyl chloride workers suffered from a disease
they named acroosteolysis-a painful and disabling disease affecting bones
and connective tissue, especially in the hands. 160 Industry worked actively
to hide the link between vinyl chloride and acroosteolysis from the
pUblic. 161
The industry had established its own standard for vinyl chloride
exposure in 1954, limiting the "time-weighted average" over the course of
a work day to 500 parts per million (ppm), but allowing short-term
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, supra note 150, at 35,892.
29 U.S.c. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
Brown, supra note 154, at 134.
Id.
Id. at 134-35.
160. !d. at 135.
161. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 27, at 176-77.
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exposures above that 1imit. 162 In 1967, as evidence of the hazards of vinyl
chloride continued to grow, industry lowered its standard to a 200 ppm
time-weighted average, and 500 ppm absolute exposure limit. 163 OSHA,
which was founded in 1970, initially adopted the industry standard for
vinyl chloride in 1971; the agency's first review of the issue in depth came
in 1974. 164
As evidence about the effects of vinyl chloride on human health
accumulated, one uncommon form of cancer, angiosarcoma of the liver,
was at the forefront. It is such a rare disease that in the 1970s there were
only 20 to 30 cases per year of angiosarcoma in the United States. 165 The
disease is strongly associated with vinyl chloride exposure, occurring
among PVC workers at 400 to 3,000 times the rate in the general
population. 166 In January 1974, B.F. Goodrich announced the death of
three PVC workers from angiosarcoma of the liver. 167 This disclosure
tipped the balance, making it clear to regulators that workers were dying
from vinyl chloride exposure.
At the same time, other serious evidence about the health effects of vinyl
chloride was bursting into public view. Data linking vinyl chloride to
cancers in laboratory animals were first presented at a conference in
1970. 168 An Italian scientist, Perluigi Viola, published data in 1971
showing that rats exposed to high doses of vinyl chloride developed a
variety of tumors.169 Meanwhile, another Italian researcher, Cesare
Maltoni, had been hired by the European chemical industry to conduct
additional tests on vinyl chloride. In 1972 he found that kidney and liver
cancers appeared in laboratory animals exposed to 250 ppm vinyl
chloride-that is, at half the short-term exposure limit accepted at the
time. 170 The American and European industries entered a secrecy
agreement to prevent public circulation of this new information. 171 But
more damaging information continued to appear. By the time of a public
hearing held by OSHA in 1974, Maltoni presented evidence of
carcinogenicity in animals exposed to levels as low as 50 ppm of vinyl
chloride. 172
162. Id. at 170-71.
163. OSHA Standards for Vinyl Chloride Plants Upheld, S ENVTL. L. REP. 10,042
(197S).

164. DONIGER, supra note lSI, at 4S.
16S. OSHA Standards for Vinyl Chloride Plants Upheld, supra note 163, at 10,042;
Brown, supra note IS2, at 130-46.
166. DONIGER, supra note lSI, at 31.
167. Brown, supra note IS2, at 130-46.
168. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 27, at 18l.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 182-83.
171. Id. at 178-91.
172. Id. at 178-91.
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In response, OSHA issued an emergency standard in April 1974,
requiring companies to keep vinyl chloride levels at or below 50 ppm. 173
OSHA then held hearings to determine what the permanent standard for
occupational vinyl chloride exposure should be. The agency initially
proposed a standard of "no detectable level" of vinyl chloride in air;
industry vigorously opposed this proposal, arguing it would force factories
to shut down.174 Over the course of the hearings, thousands of pages of
testimony were submitted from industry, unions, and occupational health
experts. Industry representatives argued that low levels of vinyl chloride
exposure had not been demonstrated to harm human health, and that strict
regulation of the carcinogen would put factories out of business. 175 Labor
and health advocates argued for stronger regulation. 176 OSHA issued a
permanent standard for occupational vinyl chloride exposure in October
1974, setting a maximum allowable exposure level of 1 ppm averaged over
an eight-hour period. l77 The standard was a slight retreat from the "no
detectable level" proposal, in response to industry objections. 178 However,
1 ppm was the next-strongest vinyl chloride standard considered by the
agency, and a huge improvement over previous standards.

What OSHA Knew
At the time of OSHA's decision, substantial incriminating evidence was
available on the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride, but many questions
remained unanswered. OSHA's success in regulating vinyl chloride
depended on the agency's willingness to take precautionary action in the
face of uncertainty. Had the agency attempted to estimate a monetary
value for the likely benefits of reducing vinyl chloride exposure, it would
have had difficulty making the case for the regulation. Much of the
information required for the "benefits" side of the balance sheet was simply
unknown at the time of OSHA's decision.
For example, OSHA had no firm estimate of how many people had been
or would be killed by angiosarcoma of the liver resulting from vinyl
chloride exposure. There was not enough information available, either
from the Italian studies or from the U.S. fatalities, to draw a dose-response
curve. OSHA was aware of carcinogenic hazards to other organs, including
the lung, kidney, brain and skin, as well as some non-cancer effects,179 but
173. See id. at 204.
174. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 27, at 213.
175. /d. at 214.
176. See id. at 215-17.
177. See id. at 220.
178. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 39 (Praeger 1993).
179. Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, supra note 150, at 35,890-91.
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the agency possessed little epidemiological data on the relationship of these
other disorders to vinyl chloride exposure in 'humans. 180 The extent of
OSHA's knowledge about the applicability of animal data to human health
was also limited. 181 It would not have been possible, in other words, to
quantify the expected health impacts resulting from a given exposure level.
Quantifying effects, however, is exactly what cost-benefit analysis requires.
In the absence of hard estimates of the magnitudes involved, many benefits
would typically be omitted from a cost-benefit analysis-in effect, valued
at zero.
Although precise quantitative estimates of impacts were not available,
important aspects of both laboratory (animal) and epidemiological (human)
evidence were available to OSHA in 1974. Animal evidence available to
OSHA at the time of the ruling included data from Cesare Maltoni and
others showing high levels of cancer in laboratory animals exposed to
concentrations as low as 50 ppm of vinyl chloride. 182 In one set of
experiments, 200 mice were exposed to 50 ppm of vinyl chloride in air for
eleven months; half of them died. 183 In short, the allowable exposure level
established by OSHA's emergency action in early 1974 was still high
enough to kill laboratory animals within months.
On top of the laboratory evidence, OSHA also knew that vinyl chloride
workers were dying. There were at least 13 confirmed cases of
angiosarcoma of the liver, which had led to deaths at B.F. Goodrich, Union
Carbide, Firestone Plastics, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber. 184 In OSHA's
view, the link between cancer and vinyl chloride was clear from these
animal and human data. 185
What OSHA did not have was any hard information on the effects of
vinyl chloride exposure below 50 ppm. The industry presented arguments
that an exposure threshold for tumor induction had been identified; OSHA
discussed and rejected this view. 186 Instead, OSHA's final ruling cited the
conclusion of the Surgeon General's Ad Hoc Committee, which found that
"safe exposure levels for carcinogenic substances cannot be scientifically
determined," and noted that testimony provided by the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) also supported the view that
no safe threshold could be defined. 187 Retreating under industry pressure

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. at 35,890.
See id. at 35,891.
See id.
See id. at 35,891.
See id. at 35,890-91.
See Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, supra note 150, at 35,891.
See id. at 35,891-92.
Id.at35,891.
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from the "no detectable level" standard favored by NIOSH and others on
scientific grounds, OSHA adopted the next-best option.

Vinyl Chloride Since 1974
In the years following OSHA's decision, scientists have continued to
collect information on the health effects of vinyl chloride exposure, and
have continued to document the growing numbers of people affected. For
example, a 1976 article documented an increased likelihood of birth defects
in populations living near vinyl chloride polymerization facilities. 188 A
1977 article presented evidence suggesting that non-occupational exposure
routes, such as living near a polymerization or fabrication plant, might also
playa role in causing angiosarcoma of the liver.189 A 1980 review article
found that research since the OSHA ruling had shown vinyl chloride to be
carcinogenic to other organs, including the brain and lung. 19o A 1986
article supported a link between vinyl chloride exposure and testicular
damage in laboratory animals. 191 An epidemiological study published in
1990 linked vinyl chloride exposure to human liver tumors other than
angiosarcoma. In
In summary, since OSHA's 1974 ruling, the evidence on health hazards
associated with vinyl chloride exposure has steadily mounted. In retrospect,
we know that vinyl chloride exposure posed severe hazards to workersand the communities around the manufacturing plants--even at low doses.
OSHA acted decisively on the incriminating information that was already
available at the time of the ruling; subsequent history has shown that the
costs of inaction would have been even higher than OSHA knew at the
time. With this history in mind, in the next section we look at what might
have transpired if OSHA had relied on formal cost-benefit analysis to
arrive at its decision.

Cost-Benefit Analysis
If OSHA had used cost-benefit analysis to evaluate its options in 1974,
what would the result have been? For cost-benefit analysis, we need dollar
values. On the "cost" side, OSHA had access to a variety of estimates.
188. See Peter F. Infante et a1., Carcinogenic, Mutagenic, and Teratogenic Risks
Associatedwith Vinyl Chloride, 41 MUTATION REs. 131, 131-34 (1976).
189. See Judith Brady et a!., Angiosarcoma of the liver: an epidemiologic survey, 59 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 1383, 1383-85 (Nov. 1977).
190. See Joseph K. Wagoner et a1., Toxicity of vinyl chloride and polyvinyl chloride as
seen through epidemiologic observations, 6 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1101, 110107 (1980).
191. See Wenfang Bi et aI., Effect of Vinyl Chloride on Testis in Rats, 10
ECOTOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. SAFETY 281, 281-89 (Dec. 1985).
192. See R. Pirastu et aI., Mortality From Liver Disease Among Italian Vinyl Chloride
Monomer/Polyvinyl Chloride Manufacturers, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 155,155-61 (1990).
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Industry representatives had put forward several estimates of what it would
cost to reduce workplace vinyl chloride exposure. In addition, OSHA
commissioned an independent study, by the consulting firm Foster D.
Snell, to gauge the likely costs of several regulatory options. 193
OSHA's consultant analyzed the costs of several regulatory options, but
did not produce estimates for the cost of the 1 ppm standard that was
ultimately adopted. For a somewhat looser standard, they estimated annual
compliance costs of $109 million. 194 A widely cited account of the
regulation, published in 1995 by the Office of Technology Assessment,
says that the best information available to OSHA implied that the cost of
the 1 ppm standard would be $1 billion. 195 It appears likely that this is a
total cost for conversion, not an annual COSt.1 96 If so, it implies an annual
compliance cost of roughly $200 million. 197 Had OSHA carried out a costbenefit analysis, we assume it would have relied on a figure of about $200
million for annual costs.
At the time of the ruling, OSHA lacked much of the data on benefits that
cost-benefit analysts would rely on today. The agency noted that about
three-quarters of the employees with the highest vinyl chloride exposure
had not been located; that the average latency period for development of
liver cancers appeared to be 20 years; and that the dose-response
relationship for angiosarcoma of the liver was not known. 198 For all these
reasons, there was no way to determine the total number of people who
193. FOSTER D. SNELL, INC., ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED
OSHA STANDARDS FOR VINYL CHLORIDE (1974) [hereinafter SNELL STUDY]. This study was
completed for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Labor, Contract No. LlA 74-167. Foster D. Snell is a subsidiary of Booz, Allen, and
Hamilton, Inc., Florham Park, NJ.
194. This is the sum of $22 million a year in the vinyl chloride monomer industry, to
reach a standard of 2-S ppm, plus $87 million a year to meet a 1O-IS ppm standard in the
PVC industry.
See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE
REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 248 (MIT
Press 1998).
19S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND
REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: AN ApPRAISAL OF OSHA's
ANALYTIC ApPROACH 89 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September
1995) (hereinafter OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT]'
196. The report by OSHA's consultants mentions, in a footnote, that one of the firms in
the industry estimated that the total capital cost for trying to reach the "no detectable" level
of vinyl chloride would be $856 million. This number is the only source we have been able
to locate for OTA's $1 billion estimate (perhaps rounded off, or with operating costs added,
to bring it up to $1 billion). See SNELL STUDY, supra note 193, at Exhibit V-IS, n.S; see
also MENDELOFF, supra note 194, at 248 n.3 (breaking down the annual cost estimates into
vinyl chloride monomer and polyvinyl chloride monomer sectors).
197. The SNELL STUDY, supra note 193, amortized capital costs over 10 years at 12%.
Applying this rule, the annual carrying cost for a $1 billion investment would be $177
million; for a $8S6 million investment, the annual carrying cost would be $151 million.
Assuming that there are operating costs as well as capital costs for compliance, we obtain a
very rough estimate of $200 million per year.
198. See Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, supra note 150, at 3S,891.
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would ultimately be affected. Evidence on other cancers or non-cancer
diseases caused by vinyl chloride was even less complete. In many costbenefit analyses, benefits with such inadequate data are routinely ignored,
on the grounds that they are impossible to quantify.
However, even in the absence of hard data on benefits, it is possible to
do the calculation in reverse: What estimates would have been needed for
the regulation to pass a cost-benefit test? The principal benefit is the
reduction in deaths caused by vinyl chloride exposure; how many lives
would OSHA have had to think it was saving in order to justify an annual
cost of $200 million? That is, if human lives were expressed as dollar
values and placed on one side of the scale, how many lives would it take to
balance out $200 million in expenses for the industries using vinyl
chloride?
The calculation can be done either with recent estimates of the dollar
value of a life, or with the much lower estimates that were common back in
1974. The highest value of a life that has been widely employed for
regulatory analysis is EPA's estimate of $4.8 million in 1990 dollars, used
in a number of decisions in the late 1990s. 199 This value was based largely
on statistical analysis of the wage differentials between slightly more and
less dangerous jobs. Frequently the value of life has been adjusted to
account for inflation; for example, in the arsenic cost-benefit analysis,
completed in 2000, EPA adjusted the $4.8 million figure up to the
equivalent in 1999 dollars, or $6.1 million. 2oo If this estimate is similarly
adjusted back to 1974, the value of a human life in that year's dollars was
$1.81 million. Thus, to "break even" against a $200 million cost in 1974,
OSHA's standard would have had to save about 110 human lives per year.
The revelations that spurred OSHA into action involved 13 cases of
vinyl chloride workers who died of angiosarcoma. In retrospect, this is not
an unreasonable estimate for the annual death rate from angiosarcoma of
the liver caused by vinyl chloride exposure. 201 It would have been
impossible for OSHA to argue that more than 100 workers were dying of
angiosarcoma each year; and data were not available on any other causes of
death linked to vinyl chloride. Therefore, cost-benefit analysis would have
199. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has used different methodologies that lead to
sharply lower values. See the discussion in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 1, at 82.
200. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976,
6976-7012 (Jan. 22, 2001).
201. I.F.H. Purchase et aI., Vinyl Chloride: An Assessment of the Risk of Occupational
Exposure, 25 Fo CHEM. TOXIC. 187-202 (1987). A total of99 cases of angiosarcoma of the
liver attributable to vinyl chloride were recorded from 1974 to 1982, or II per year. ld. at
196. Due to the long latency period for developing angiosarcoma, more cases were expected
to result from the high rates of exposure before 1974; this study predicts a cumulative total
of 150 to 300 more cases.

HeinOnline -- 57 Admin. L. Rev. 189 2005

190

ADMiNISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW

[57: i

supported the industry contention that the benefits of strict regulation of
workplace exposure did not justify the expense.
The above calculation is only one version of what a cost-benefit analysis
might have looked like. Another variant would· have argued even more
strongly against the regulation. The crucial estimate of $1.81 million per
life is a modem figure transported back in time. At the time of the OSHA
decision, in 1974, the wage-risk calculations used to value life in the 1990s
were not yet widely accepted; much lower values of life were in use for
cost-benefit calculations. In the infamous calculation in the Ford Pinto
controversy, which occurred at about the same time, Ford's economists
cited government agency estimates of the value of a life of only $200,000,
based largely on lost eamings. 202 If OSHA had actually tried to do a costbenefit analysis in 1974, it might easily have ended up using the "Pinto
value" of $200,000 per life. With this value per life a regulation would
need to save 1,000 human lives per year in order to break even against a
$200 million cost.
A total of about 1,500 workers were employed in vinyl chloride
production in 1974, and about another 5,600 worked in PVC resin
production, for a total of just over 7,000 in the affected industries. 203 Thus
to support OSHA's regulation with a cost-benefit analysis using the "Pinto
value," it would have been necessary to show that one of every seven
workers in the industry would have died from vinyl chloride exposure each
year in the absence of regulation.
If the agency had discounted future benefits, the number of deaths
required to support the regulation would have been even larger. The
average latency period for angiosarcoma cases is about 20 years.204 If the
value of a human life is discounted at a three percent discount rate over the
average 20-year delay before the diagnosis of fatal cancer, then each life
becomes worth only 55 percent as much: 205 the $l.81 million "modem
value" drops to a present value of $1 million, while the $200,000 "Pinto
value" shrinks to $110,000. At these rates, about 200 deaths per year in the
former case, or around 2,000 in the latter, would have to be averted in order
for the policy to be worth its billion dollar price tag. A higher discount

202. E.S. GRUSH & C.S. SAUNBY, Fatalities Associated with Crash-Induced Fuel
Leakages and Fires, reprinted in THE FORD PINTO CASE: A STUDY IN ApPLIED ETHICS,
BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY 171 (Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds., SUNY Press
1994).
203. Brown, supra note 152, at 130-46.
204. See, e.g., Janet Kielhorn et ai., Vinyl Chloride: Still A Cause for Concern,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, July 2000, available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/
docs/2000/l08p579-588kielhorn!abstract.html (last visited Jan. 10,2005).
205. The present value of a benefit B, received 20 years from now, at a 3% discount rate,
is B/(1.03io, which is roughly equal to 0.55B.
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rate, which analysts commonly used at the time,2°6 would have reduced the
present value of the fatalities even more, raising the number of averted
deaths required to 'justify" the regulation even farther beyond the bounds
of plausibility. At a seven percent discount rate, the break-even number of
avoided deaths is about 400 per year with the modem value of life, or 4,000
with the Pinto value. At a ten percent discount rate, the break-even point
jumps to roughly 700 with the modem value, or 7,000-the entire
workforce of the industry-with the Pinto value. That is, using a ten
percent discount rate and the value of life estimated in the 1970s, it would
be necessary to show that every worker in the industry, every year, would
have died in the absence of the standard, in order to justify the regulation in
cost-benefit terms.
The report by OSHA's consultants included estimated costs for more
lenient standards, with ceilings of 10,25, or 50 ppm of vinyl chloride in the
air. These would have required smaller, but still substantial, numbers of
avoidable deaths to "justify" their adoption in cost-benefit terms. With the
number of known deaths in the low two figures, cost-benefit calculations
would indicate that even these standards were too expensive for the
benefits that would be achieved.
An Unexpected Bargain

As it turned out, the advance estimate of the costs of reducing vinyl
chloride exposure was just that: an estimate. Producers quickly adopted
innovative technologies that made it much easier to limit vinyl chloride in
air. A 1978 study estimated that the industry had spent only $20 million
per year-a tenth of the predicted valutr-On compliance in the four years
since the rule was passed. 207 A former economist at the Department of
Labor concluded that the actual cost of complying with the standard was
only seven percent of the predicted cost. 208 According to a later
retrospective overview by the Office of Technology Assessment, the total
cost of compliance with the regulation was about a quarter of what had
been estimated, and none of the producers were driven out of the industry
by regulatory costS. 209 Whether the actual costs were seven percent, a
tenth, or a quarter of the original estimate, it is clear that compliance costs
were a fraction of the best guess OSHA was able to come up with in
206. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REv. 39, 4546 (1999).
207. MENDELOFF, supra note 194, at 248 (citing HERBERT R. NORTHRUP ET AL., THE
IMPACT OF OSHA 383-89 (Indus. Research Unit, Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa. 1978)).
208. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 178, at 268-69 (citing Marguerite Connerton &
Mark MacCarthy, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulation: Expressway to Reform or Blind
Alley? 21 (Center for National Policy 1982)).
209. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 195, at 89.
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advance. Meanwhile, our knowledge of the benefits continues to grow as
the evidence accumulates on a wide variety of disorders associated with
vinyl chloride exposure. OSHA did not know any of this at the time of the
ruling; but its precautionary decision has been vindicated by the science, as
well as the economic information, that has accumulated since 1974.
Cost-benefit analysis would have argued strongly against OSHA's
prescient regulation; once again, it would have been wrong in retrospect.
CONCLUSION

If the EPA had been required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before
taking lead out of gasoline, the agency might never have acted. Ironically,
that would have meant that the famous 1980s cost-benefit analysis of
removing lead from gasoline would never have happened either, because
there would have been no data on falling levels of lead in children's blood.
Likewise, cost-benefit calculations with realistic nuclear costs would have
led the RAND analysts to the obvious conclusion that they happily and
mistakenly missed: big dams are a very cheap way to generate electricity, if
that is all that matters. And cost-benefit analysis would have shown that
vinyl chloride regulation was too expensive for the benefits it produced. It
would seemingly have been optimal, in cost-benefit terms, to have allowed
more workers to die of cancer every year in order to have cheaper vinyl
siding on the market.
Our country has enacted many farsighted, protective laws and
regulations governing public health and the environment. Economic
analysis has sometimes played an important supporting role in improving
these regulations. But economics has not been the gatekeeper, allowed to
make the final decision on which regulations will take effect and which
will not. A rigid insistence on making regulations pass cost-benefit tests
would, in retrospect, have gotten the wrong answer time after time. There
is no reason to expect the same narrow methods to perform any better
today.
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